Stereotypes Howitt Et Al 1989

… e been the only cause for such discrimination, maximis ing the differences between the two groups. According to Allport’s earlier definition of stereotyping, such a pre judgement must be resistant to change. Such resistance may be put down to the processes of thinking leading to biases (Howitt, et al.

, 1989), as seen in the experiment above. For us to believe that our prejudgments are correct, what we perceive to be is what we see. For example, Duncan (1976) showed that how we perceive the social world can be affected by our categorizations, such as, in this case, racial stereotypes. The study found that, because black people were stereotyped as aggressive people (by the subjects), the subjects perceived a situation as being more aggressive, close to a fight, when played by black actors whereas with white actors, it was seen as playful. Such biases may also be looked at as self-fulfilling, or even self-protecting, the ‘sense of self’. This self positivity is ‘natural’, and as such can be projected onto one’s perception of the in-group – having similar effects at the other end of the spectrum.

That is, a negative view of an individual, projected onto ‘their’ group, or the out-group. This is the reason for most stereotypes being negative. Our categorization and biases can also have an effect on others. Essex (1988) found that white stereotyping of black people had a damaging effect in job interviews, through discomfort and unrest due to the questions asked during the interview. This study was conducted out of the laboratory. A further example of the effects of racial stereotyping on others is a replication of a British government commissioned study in which a black and a white person apply to rent a flat.

The landlords pre judgement of black people through stereotyping affected the black man’s chance and legal right to rent the flat (BBC television, Black and White, 1987). This is an example of the out-group homogeneity effect (Brown, 1995). As well as exaggeration of inter-group differences, another key effect of categorization is the enhancement of intra-group similarities, known as inter-group homogeneity. The effect of this cognitive process of thought, through categorization is the perception that the out-group is more homogeneous than the in-group Hamilton (1979) found that black families were viewed in more categorical terms than white families, who were individually perceived. Jones, et al. (1981) found a similar effect; that members of university clubs saw their group members’ personality traits as more diverse than out-group members’.

A criticism of this study, and the homogeneity effect as a whole, is that members of an in-group will know their peers more than those of the out-group, especially in terms of personality. Thus, such studies do not contribute wholly to the cognitive explanation of stereotyping. However, the homogeneity effect has undergone investigation by many studies, and conflicting evidence has arisen. Nevertheless, a point that has been overlooked is that, with members of an in-group recognising variability within their group, surely such variability is seen by members of an out-group, within their group.

This displays a cognitive error of ignorance. Even so, there is no empirical evidence to support such a claim. Categorisation, according to the above, is a ‘natural’ cognitive process, that ‘naturally’ leads to stereotyping. As Howitt, et al. (1989) state: ‘cognitive dynamics [of stereotyping] are a natural part of thinking because we must categorize the social world, and in doing so, inevitably build up stereotypical assumptions, protected by our cognitive biases’. The cognitive approach of categorization does have its flaws however.

Categorisation theorists give a rather mechanistic impression of cognition, and thus, their approach to stereotyping (Billig, 1985). We do have a choice in our assumptions and there is a flexibility about human thinking (Howitt, et al. , 1989). Therefore, cognition is not as rigid as categorization implies. It is an oversimplification in itself to suggest that language oversimplifies the world, because it is due to language that our views of the social world can be expressed. However, language does not have to be present for stereotyping to be present.

For example, the Minimal Group Paradigm. Even so, language aids our categorization and thus, our stereotyping. It is the same language that we may use to stereotype that enables us to be the reverse. For example, in the interviews mentioned above, the interviewers could be taught to ask non-categorical questions. As concepts in our minds, tolerance is as easy as prejudice. Our supposed necessity to simplify the world, as we are ‘incapable’ of taking in ‘every new stimulus as unique’ (Park and Rothbard, 1982), may also be balanced by a statement of the opposite: ‘we would find difficulty in adapting to a world which required action, if no new stimulus could be treated as unique, but every unique stimulus had to be considered as similar to others’ (Billig, 1985).

This is the basis of Billig’s argument of particularization against categorization – that gives rise to the processes of individualization – treating and perceiving group members as individuals. Categorisation argues that, through our ‘natural’ pattern of thought, or cognition, our perception of stimuli is categorized by its similarities rather than its individuality. Billig suggests that this can change, through a motivational process in categorization itself, giving flexibility to such cognitive processes. We are aware of the possibility and ability to change.

However, we do not express this flexibility because it is a disruption of the norm, or, of the social group-thought. Goff man (1959) views everyday life as dramaturgical (‘All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players… .’ Shakespeare). To disrupt this would be to change the script, and break out of the conformity of the social group, self-to-self and to others. Even so, this illustrates that through our ability to categorize, we have the ability to particularize and ‘do more with the stimuli than accumulate more instances of predetermined categories’ (Billig, 1985).

In Billig’s alternative approach to stereotyping, he also raises the point of category selection – a problem that cognitive psychologists have often overlooked. Tverskoy and Gat i (1978) found that different stimuli are judged on their similarities and differences before categorization and this judgement can be different depending on what way the stimuli is perceived. Billig’s point is that we must particularize before categorizing and thus a link has been formed. Categorisation implies a rigidity in our cognition. Stereotypes, by nature, are over generalizations. Such inflexibility is not a possible process of our cognition – ‘categorization do not exist in isolation’ (Billig, 1985).

As categorization leads to many categories, through its definition, surely only one such category could possibly be so rigid and inflexible, as other categories must be used by it, and thus be flexible. Therefore, categorization is not a rigid process, but involves change – which is reflective of our cognition and change is possible (conflicting with Allport’s definition). The difference between two groups affects other attributes of the out-group, including those that are similar to the in-group. By subdividing further such similarities, we are initiating a defence against change in our attitudes and categories. This inventiveness is another example of the flexibility of categorization. In the most extreme cases, this can lead to an inventiveness demonstrated by racial theorists, which in fact, contradicts their prejudice and rigidity of categories.

This flexibility can be illustrated further by studies that have shown that in stereotyping, people imply that most of a group posses a stereotypic trait but not all members. Thus, is the need for ‘special cases’, realisation of individualization and tolerance (Billig, 1985). According to the cognitive approach, stereotyping is a group process. It may occur in groups, but it is the individual psyches that make up the group, that project their stereotypes through a group.

We do have the ability to see people as individuals and particularize their unique characteristics. We can change, as even categorization is flexible, which undermines the cognitive approach with categorization, although it may take time on a social level. To conclude, the cognitive approach alone does not give us an understanding of stereotyping. However, it does anchor the fact that through our ‘natural’ thought processes we do categorize, which leads to stereotyping. It also highlights the importance of the individual and the group. There are, however, problems that have been overlooked by cognitive psychologists which we need to understand, in order to fully understand the ‘changing dynamics and nature of stereotyping in our society’ (Howitt, et al.

, 1989). There is also the need to look further than the causes of stereotyping and into its effects in order to understand the processes of our thought, of stereotyping.