… , and Washington knew that he had to defeat the British in 1781 or see his army disappear. He hoped for a combined American-French assault on New York, but in August he received word that a French fleet was proceeding to Chesapeake Bay for a combined land and sea operation against another British army in Virginia, and unwillingly agreed to march south. Washington and Rochambeau’s movement of 7000 troops, half of them French, from New York State to Virginia in less than five weeks was a masterpiece of execution. Washington sent word ahead to the marquis de Lafayette, commanding American forces in Virginia, to keep the British commander, Lord Cornwallis, from leaving his base of operations at Yorktown. At the end of September the Franco-American army joined Lafayette.
Out numbering the British by two to one, and with 36 French ships offshore to prevent Yorktown from being relieved by sea, Washington forced Cornwallis to surrender in October after a brief siege. Although peace and British recognition of United States independence did not come for another two years, Yorktown proved to be the last major land battle of the Revolution. Washington’s contribution to American victory was enormous, and analysis of his leadership reveals much about the nature of the military and political conflict. Being selective about where and when he fought the British main force prevented his enemy from using their strongest asset, the quality and discipline of their soldiers. At the same time, Washington remained a conventional military officer. He rejected proposals made by General Charles Lee early in the war for a second commander.
As a person who is very conservative, he shrank from the social stander des; as a patriot, he was determined to show that American officers could be every bit as civilized and genteel as their European counterparts. The practical result of this caution and even inhibition was to preserve the Continental army as a visible demonstration of American government when allegiance to that government was weak. In one of his last acts as commander, Washington issued a circular letter to the states pleading them to form a vibrant, forcing national government. In 1783 he returned to Mount Vernon and became in the mid-1780 s a forceful and effective farmer. Shays’ Rebellion, an armed revolt in Massachusetts, convinced many Americans of the need for a stronger government. Washington and other Virginia nationalists were instrumental in bringing about the Constitutional Convention of 1787 to promote that end.
Elected as a delegate to the convention by the Virginia General Assembly, Washington was chosen its president. In this position he played virtually no role-either formal or behind the scenes-in the deliberations of the convention; however, his reticence and lack of intellectual flair may well have enhanced his objectivity in the eyes of the delegates, by those means contributing to the unselfconscious give and take that was the hallmark of the framers’ careful thoughts. In addition, the probability that Washington would be the first president may have eased the task of designing that office. Washington’s attendance at the Constitutional Convention and his support for ratification of the Constitution were critically important for its success in the state conventions that met in 1787 and 1788. George Washington was elected president in 1788 and again in 1792, Washington presided over the formation and initial operation of the new government. His stiff dignity and sense of propriety postponed the emergence of the fierce replacement that would characterize the administrations of his three immediate successors-John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison.
He also made very important decisions. He also established the cabinet, although no such body was never thought of by the Constitution. He remained as a low socially stander ed in Congress, because avoiding the development of court and opposition factions. By appointing Alexander Hamilton secretary of the treasury and Thomas Jefferson secretary of state, he brought the two most skillful and most principled figures of the revolutionary generation into central positions of responsibility. Washington supported the introduction of the taxing policy proposed by Hamilton-a funded national debt, the creation of the Bank of the United States, assumption of state debts, and excise taxes, especially on whiskey, by which the federal government would protest its power to impose controversial taxes and import duties high enough to pay the interest on the new national debt. Similarly, he allowed Jefferson to pursue a policy of seeking trade and cooperation with all European nations.
Washington did not anticipate that Hamilton’s and Jefferson’s policies were ultimately incapable. Hamilton’s plan for an expanding national debt slowing down a attractive rate of return for investors depended on a high level of trade with Britain produce enough import-duty investment income to service the debt. Hamilton therefore felt that he had to interfere in to the extent of leaking secret shipments to the British. The outbreak of war between revolutionary France and a union led by Britain, Prussia, and Austria in 1793 endangered American foreign policy and disabled Jefferson’s rival foreign policy design.
When the French representative, Edmond Gen&ec irc; t, arrived in Charleston in April 1793 and began recruiting American privateers-and promising assistance to land speculators who wanted French assistance in forcing Spain to get out of the Gulf Coast-Washington insisted, over Jefferson’s reservations, that the U. S. are going to remain neutral in the war between France and Britain. Washington’s anti-French leanings, bond with the aggressive attitude of the new government in France toward the U. S. , because this served to bring about the victory of Hamilton’s pro-British foreign policy- approved by Jay’s Treaty of 1795, which settled outstanding American differences with Britain.
The treaty-which many Americans felt hold ed too many compromises to the British-touched off a storm of debate. The Senate ratified it, but opponents in the House of Representatives tried to block appropriations to establish the arbitration machinery. In a rare display of political argument, Washington challenged the propriety of the House tampering with treaty making. His unfriendliness on this occasion cost him his prized reputation as a leader above party, but it was also determined in securing a 51-48 vote by the House to carry out the treaty. Conscious of the value of his constructive role in shaping the presidency and certainly stung by the abusive language hurled at advocates of the Jay Treaty, Washington carefully prepared a farewell address to mark the end of his presidency, calling on the U. S.
to avoid both confusion alliances and party rancor. After leaving office in 1797, Washington retired to Mount Vernon, where he died on December 14, 1799.