… he ability to distinguish the “is of artistic identification” (Danto, 206). By this, Danto means that a simple man who sees Oldenburg’s bed that has a rhomboid frame and declares that it is a bed is not wrong, because it is a bed, but he is unable to see that the artwork is a bed, which is also an artwork-he fails to comprehend the is that allows him to identify the thing as an artwork. This “is of artistic identification” is much more easily distinguished when presented in the right context and accompanied with a theory of art. The knowledge and context presented by an allows a simple man to become aware of a thing, like a bed, or a Brillo box, as not just the artifact, but as an actual work of art. Danto’s argument is best summed up as follows: “To see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry-an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an art world (Danto, 209).” Dickie plays off of Danto’s concept of an art world, but he modifies it by adding a greater, more complex framework to it, effectively turning Danto’s historical / theoretical art world concept into an informal institution.
Dickie’s so called “institutional theory of art” has two requirements for a thing to be defined as an artwork: the first is that there must be an artifact, which Dickie defines as the regular dictionary definition of something made by humans with a purpose in mind, and second, the artifact must be presented to the informal human institution of the art world public. Dickie believes that the institution of the art world public is an informal complex of all those people that play a role in the many activities that contribute to making a work of art what it is. The art world public is composed of artists, museum curators, connoisseurs, art theorists, art patrons, art brokers / dealers , art historians, art critics, etc. , in short anyone who plays a role in the conventional activities of the institutional art world. Dickie’s “institutional theory of art” essentially establishes a framework of conventions. These are dynamic conventions that are as open to change as the concept of art itself.
All the varying conventions are tied together through a common understanding shared by the art world public that they are “engaged in an activity or practice within which there are a variety of roles: artist roles, public roles, critic roles, director roles, curator roles, and so on (Dickie, 221).” Dickie’s art world is made up of many “individual art world systems”, which are essentially just the systems that vary with each artistic medium like painting, poetry, or theatre, and each system is divided into many different roles, the core roles being those of artist and public. Let us quickly run through an example of what all is involved in one art world system in order to better get a feel for how much is involved in Dickie’s institutional theory of an art world. What all goes into making a theatre production what it is? I imagine that it starts with a playwright writing a script. Then the playwright has to find a producer who wants to put on his play. The producer finds a director, who finds actors, and then rehearsal begins. The play requires a theater to be performed in front of an audience.
The play may or may not require props, lighting, backdrops, different stage sets, etc. Then, after the play has been presented to the public, art critics offer critiques of the play. If it is a hit, maybe the play will go on tour, or get turned into a movie, and the cycle will begin anew; if it is a dud and nobody likes it, it might show a couple of more times before it dies. This is an elaborate system of conventions in which many of the conventions can be thrown out and the system can still be complete. The two core conventions of any system is the creation of the artifact, a script to be performed as a play in this case, and the presentation of the play to the art world public. The institutional art world conceived in this way can account for an open concept of art because the art world public is a loosely defined, dynamic grouping of people who have the ability to adjust their recognition of what art is as the properties of artifacts and artistic movements change over time.
Thus, Dickie’s “institutional theory” is compatible with Weitz’s open concept of art and does not seek to find the nature of art in any set of necessary and sufficient conditions manifest in the artwork itself. It also encompasses Danto’s conception of an art world composed of art theory and a knowledge of art history with its informal conception of the art world public, which includes the activity of the roles of both art theorists and art historians. Both of these roles bring a certain enriching knowledge to the framework of conventions that the institution embodies. So, Weitz’s open concept theory and Danto’s theory of an art world reach a kind of culmination under Dickie’s “institutional theory” in which a framework of countless conventions are able to mold and adapt to new artifacts that are also intentionally presented to an art world public. This theory provides a full and flexible framework for the definition of all the modern art of today and of the future. However, what it fails to do is provide a means for judging good art from bad art; all it does is offer a broad criterion for whether something may or may not be considered an artwork.
If an artifact is created by an artist and is presented to an art world public than it is to be considered a work of art. If either of these conditions is not met, then it is not a work of art. In Weitz’s theory, the aesthetic theories of the past uphold the standards for excellence in art and a knowledge of these theories allows for a standard of judgment that any person that can read may have access to. In Danto’s theory the same standards for distinguishing what art is and whether it is good or not can be determined through knowledge of art theory and art history. So, it seems that although Dickie’s theory is influenced by both Weitz’s and Danto’s theories, his falls short of establishing a standard way for the average individual to make judgments about whether art is good or bad. Dickie’s theory requires that judgments of whether an artwork is good or bad be left to an art world elite who’s specific role it is to make judgments of this kind, namely the art critics.
But, then again, it seems quite possible that anyone who educates themselves enough about the conventional framework of the art world necessarily becomes part of that public in which case the standard of judgment becomes similar to that of Weitz’s and Danto’s theories, i. e. the standard of judgment can be obtained through the acquisition of an education of aesthetic theory, history, and criticism. So, before taking this class I had virtually no art history or art theory, but now I have a nice overview of art theory through history, in which case my ability to make judgments about art has definitely been elevated. However, I don’t feel that just because I have the knowledge offered by this class that I am now magically part of the art world public. In order to be able to claim that I am part of the art world public, I must take up a specific role; I must acquire a genuine “eye” for art-a desire to experience it, take serious interest in it, critique it, and buy it.
In other words, I can read all the books on art that I want and not be considered part of the art world public until I make use of that knowledge through participation in one of the many roles in any of the individual art world systems.