Boethius’ Argument Against Universals In the essay From His Second Commentary on Porphyry s Isagoge Boethius discusses the existence of universals… By proposing two main arguments, he first shows why a view such as that held by Plato (one claiming that universals exist independent of particulars and that a universal exists wholly in each particular at all times) is false. Then he presents his own view of the relationship between universals and particulars which is based on the idea that the universals exist in the collectivity of the particulars. Boethius first argument against a Platonic view of universals concerns how a single universal can exist wholly and entirely in each particular thing to which it is common. A universal is supposedly one entity existing in every particular to which it is common at all times. But Boethius argues that if it is to exist wholly in several things at one time, it cannot in itself be one entity.
According to Boethius everything that exists exists for the reason that it is one. And therefore, if the universal is existing in several things at one time (and thus is not one in number) then it cannot exist in this Platonic fashion. Boethius second argument deals with universals if they are to be spoken of as being many rather than one. He explains that to say is also false. For to say this is to imply that there will be no last (universal set above the others). This is because there will be a universal set over many things and will thus be multiple.
And because it is in many things, it has a likeness of what is a (universal). But it is a likeness that is not one in number and therefore, another (universal) of that (universal) is also to be searched for. Boethius explains that this is an infinite cycle and because of tha the universal has no real meaning in this context Boethius tells that in order to exist and remain one in number, the universal must instead exist either: in parts belonging to individual things (the universal is divided among many particulars), in its entirety to one single particular at some given time (the particular in which it exists changing over a period of time), or in that it is common to all particulars at once but not in a way so that it is of the substance of what it is common to… (but rather) as a stage-play, or some spectacle which is common to all the spectators. But the universal cannot exist in any one of these ways, as Boethius explains; for it is supposed to be common in such a way that both the whole of it is in all its singulars, and at one time, and also it is able to constitute and form the substance of what it is common to. Boethius finally presents his own understanding of the existence of universals.
Rather than a Platonic view where the particular things are dependent on the universals, Boethius speaks of a theory where the universals are dependent on the particulars. That is, it is the collective particular things which create the universals. Boethius uses the example of individual man and his relationship to species and genus to illustrate this concept: distinct individual men give the likeness of humanity. Boethius claims this likeness to be the species. Likewise, the likeness of distinct species (those of a wide range of different animals) make up a genus.
In this example, the species and the individual men are analogous to the particulars. The genus then, is analogous to a universal, thus showing that it is from particulars that comes the universals.