… progress’. Lewin can not comprehend how some Western observers can still claim that nothing really happens, that ‘there is no well-defined program, notably for economic reforms’. Such statements are ‘sheer obstinacy’, according to the author since ideas for change are being debated, implemented, and tested.
And the fact that no comprehensive program has been announced seems rather as a good sign to Lewin, since ‘for what single program could fill the bill?’ (p. 116-117). As against Medvedev, Lewin does not spend much time describing ‘the battle against the bottle’. He sums everything up in one sentence instead of two chapters and has a different view of the success fulness of this initiative:’ Although many predicted failure, the government stuck to its guns, gained public support for its aims and the anti-drinking campaign has achieved some success. This was clever and promising opening’ (p. 116).
Lewin’s conclusions about the changes in the agricultural sector and foreign policy are very similar to that of Medvedev. The author talks about how the center would ease its control, how government would give more freedom in the choices that people involved in producing the agricultural goods can have. Lewin underlined the importance of Gorbachev’s decision to allocate allotments which led to the bigger interest of the Soviet people in working the land which ultimately led to the increase in agricultural production. Lewin also mentions the better Russian-American relations which was due to the fact that Gorbachev was ready for discussions with the American president and has chosen such international policy that led to the slowing down of the arms race and the reduction of the accumulation of arms. As for the domestic policy Lewin has a different position than Medvedev, this is due to a large extent to the fact that Lewin is writing his work two years after Medvedev.
‘Glasnost, democratization, self-government in the workplace, orientation to the social sphere, social justice, human rights, and respect for human individuality’ – reforms in these areas took place after three years of Gorbachev in power and influenced domestic policy a lot according to Lewin (p. 119). At the very end of the book Lewin makes a statement that proved to be so true after the couple of years since this work was published. ‘The old system is still in place and its supporters, deeply disturbed by the perestroika, will certainly resist change.
The reformers are not assured of victory: they will have to fight hard for it, go for bold new moves. Their failure would be terribly costly for the USSR and could well produce negative repercussions worldwide. The world is now watching Moscow attentively and with good reason’ (p. 153). It is hard to believe that these words were written eight years ago…
The third book is probably the most important one since it is the work of the man who is directly responsible for the changes that took place in the and who is also responsible, although indirectly, for the changes that took place in the whole Eastern Europe. Gorbachev wrote a book entitled ” Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the World’ back in 1987, two years after he became the new Soviet leader. In this book the author tries to answer the question of what is perestroika? Why does the Soviet society need it? What are its substance and objectives? What does it reject and what does it create? How is it proceeding and what might be its consequences for the Soviet Union and the world community? In other words, all the questions that were raised and discussed by Medvedev and Lewin but answered by the originator. Perestroika, according to Gorbachev, is an ‘urgent necessity arising from the profound processes of development in our socialist society. This society is ripe for change.
It has been long yearning for it’ (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 17). Perestroika was caused by all sorts of problems that the Soviet Union had accumulated over the seventy years. First factor was a slowing economic growth which caused ‘a country that was once quickly closing on the world’s advanced nations began to lose one position after another’. At the same time the gap in the efficiency of production, quality of products, scientific and technological development… began to widen, and not to our advantage’.
All this eventually led to an economic deadlock and stagnation that paralyzed Soviet society. Declining rates of growth affected other aspects of the Soviet life, for instance the social sphere, which began to lag behind other spheres in terms of technological development, personnel, know-how and quality of work. Gorbachev also mentions a gradual erosion of the ideological and moral values of Soviet people as another argument for the need of restructuring. People did not believe in the government because of the many promises that it made and never accomplished; because the needs and opinions of ordinary working people, of the public at large, were ignored. There was a process of decay in public morals;’ the great feeling of solidarity with each other that was forged during the heroic times of the Revolution, the first five-year plans, the Great Patriotic War and postwar rehabilitation was weakening’ (p. 21-22).
Gorbachev also talks about alcoholism, drug addiction and culture alien to Soviet people, which ‘bred vulgarity and low tastes and brought about ideological bareness’. This statement about ‘alien to us’ culture reminded me of how this fight against ” degeneration’ which American movies and other media brings was carried out -how people were hiding the fact that they have the VCR, how it would be almost impossible to get a videotape with an American movie but people would still manage to get it ‘through a friend of a friend’ and then watch it, which as Gorbachev puts it ‘bred vulgarity and low tastes’. Considering all the problems the government made ‘the only logical conclusion’ that the country was verging on crisis. This conclusion was announced at the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, ‘which inaugurated the new strategy of perestroika and formulated its basic principles’ (p. 24). Gorbachev gives a plan of perestroika, its component parts which include: overcoming the stagnation process, breaking down the braking mechanism.
It means mass initiative. ‘It is the comprehensive development of democracy, socialist self-government, encouragement of initiative, improved order and discipline, more glasnost, criticism in all spheres of the society; respect for the individual’. Perestroika is also the intensification of the Soviet economy, development of the principles of democratic centralism and encouragement of socialist enterprise. It also means ‘the elimination from society of the distortions of socialist ethics, implementation of the principles of social justice.
It means the unity of words and deeds, rights and duties’. But Gorbachev does not forget to include Lenin and says that ‘the essence of perestroika lies in the fact that it unites socialism with democracy and revives the Leninist concept of socialist construction both in theory and in practice’ (p. 34-35). Gorbachev also gives his evaluation of perestroika.
He is writing this book two and a half years after the new line was launched and his assessment is as follows: ‘perestroika is just getting of the ground. So far we have only been shaping the mechanisms of acceleration’ (p. 64). The real work for him is still ahead and the main task is to get the whole society involved in the process of restructuring. In conclusion Gorbachev spends a lot of time talking about ‘new political thinking’, new Soviet foreign policy which should benefit international relations, especially Soviet-American relations and provide for ‘nuclear-free, non-violent world’.
The main task of the Soviet foreign policy is to move ‘from suspicion and hostility to confidence, from a balance of fear to a balance of reason and goodwill, from narrow nationalist egoism to cooperation’ (p. 254). Gorbachev feels that the not only the Soviet Union but the whole world needs restructuring, a fundamental change – this, of course, does not come as a surprise, if we remember that since 1917 first Bolsheviks and than communists wanted to make this ‘fundamental change’. The three books that were discussed above were all written by different authors and in different times but still basically they all have the same approach. Medvedev and Lewin both approve the new leader of the Soviet Union and give all kinds of good adjectives to describe him such as ‘bright’ and ‘intelligent’.
They both are optimistic about the future of the country although make it clear that this is only a beginning of the story to follow and since the perestroika just started at the time they were writing their works they can only speculate about what would happen to the country. As for Gorbachev he is probably the most optimistic about the new line which is not surprising since he is the leader and leaders should radiate with confidence. He is also the best source for finding out what perestroika is all about, its goals and its origins. Ofcourse now in 1996 many of his statements sound unfounded, even funny but when we read his work we have to keep in mind that back in 1985 Gorbachev’s ideas sounded new and revolutionary, destined to change the Soviet Union and even the whole world – which did in fact happen. The question whether Gorbachev’s perestroika was a failure or a success does not have an easy immediate answer.
Some scholars argue that the reforms that lasted from 1985 to 1990 caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving the country on the verge of crisis, with economy in chaos and no certain future. Joan E. Spero, the author of the book ‘The Politics Of International Economic Relations’, is the supporter of this point of view. In the chapter entitled ‘The Failure of Perestroika’s he shows by using different examples, such as economical progress, stability of the country and so on, that Gorbachev failed to objectives of perestroika (Spero, 1996, p 336). Although I agree that Gorbachev did not achieve some of the goals stated in his book ‘Perestroika’, Believe that perestroika was a success to a certain extent. First of all, he did achieve some of the objectives.
For instance, after the reforms the society did become more open thanks to glasnost. People for the first time since 1917 could say what they really thought and not what was ‘good for the party’. People also gained access to all sorts of information which was previously denied to them. Children in schools and students in colleges could finally learn the history as it was and not as it was seen by the Communist party.
Another major success of perestroika was the increasing openness of the country to the West which led to considerable improvements in East-West relations. This also led to the gradual reduction of arms and considerable decline in defense spending in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States. Considering these and other positive results of perestroika I would have to disagree with those people who say that it was a complete failure. The restructuring that took place in the Soviet Union has many dimensions – some are positive, some are negative. One-sided view which Joan E. Spero and other scholars advocate is not correct, since it concentrates only on the adverse effects of perestroika, completely ignoring all the positive effects that it had..