… die East. Thus, the coverage in the two periods supports the view that only when there are special developments within Canada do Canadian newspapers, to any significant degree, inform their readers about aspects of Canada’s relations with the . (3) Orientation of Middle East Coverage In the last quarter of 1985, all sample stories were assessed in terms of whether or not they were conflictual or non-conflictual in character. Items were coded as conflictual if they dealt with violent events in the Middle East (e. g.
, fighting, bombings, assassinations, hostage-takings, etc. ) or with non-violent conflict that extended beyond what would be perceived by the Canadian reader as normal societal competition (related to political parties, leadership, etc. ) and was suggestive of political, economic or social turmoil, decay and / or disintegration. Using this broad definition, 86. 7% of items were classified as conflictual in nature or both conflictual and non-conflictual. Of these, 340 or 72.
3% dealt with violence in or related to the region. Canadian press coverage from December 1987 to September 1988 was also very heavily conflictual in character. As indicated, Israel was the dominant focus and the majority of stories dealt with its actions in the occupied territories. It is clear from the headlines that almost all of these reported on the use of violent means to repress the Palestinian uprising. The results for both periods thus bear out the third hypothesis that press coverage of the Middle East is, not surprisingly, essentially negative in nature. (4) The Tilt of Canadian Middle East Coverage On the recurring question of the bias of Canadian press coverage, Table 1 reports on the perspective of all editorials on the Middle East in the five newspapers examined from October 1 to December 31, 1985.
The table indicates that while there was virtually no favourable editorial treatment of either Israel or the Arab states, unfavourable comment was directed primarily at the Arabs. The whole series of Palestinian violent incidents, starting with the seizure of the Achille Lauro in early October and culminating in the Rome and Vienna airport killings just after Christmas, provoked strongly worded editorial denunciations of the terrorist actions of certain radical Palestinians and their supporters, of the alleged role of Yasser Arafat and the PLO in these incidents, and of the responses of the Egyptian and other Arab governments to them. By contrast, criticism of Israel was largely confined to reaction to an Israeli Air Force raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis which occurred at the very beginning of the coding period. Despite the strong condemnation of some Arab governments and organizations in the wake of the hostage-takings and killings, there was generally even-handed treatment of Israel and the Arabs in discussion of the overall Middle East peace process. All five newspapers ran editorials that were coded as neutral in their perspectives on the continuing quest for peace in the region. While there were differences in their focus and mood, the general tenor suggested that all of the writers, however strongly they deplored the Palestinian terrorist acts, recognized that the rights of that community must be reflected in any peace settlement.
The Chronicle-Herald’s editorial of December 14 was representative: ”It would seem to be axiomatic that no significant agreement in the Middle East can be reached without the PLO.’ ‘ In contrast with 1985, it was Israel rather than the Arabs and Palestinians that was subjected to unfavourable coverage in 1987- 88. The news stories dealing with the intifada h frequently appeared under negative headlines, of which the following are only examples: ”Violence scarring face of Israel”; ”Israel bares iron fist”;’ ‘Brutal Israel sees no alternatives”; and ”Iron fist policy straining loyalty of Jews to Israel.’ ‘ While there were editorials and features both favourable and unfavourable to Israel, the tendency was clearly towards the latter, although we did not undertake a precise count as in 1985. Most opinion pieces centred specifically on Canadian responses to Israeli policy, but in a manner that reflected a lack of sympathy for Israel. Thus, in a January editorial, the Sun asserted that as the death toll mounts and world opinion grows increasingly impatient with Israel, ”the lack of protest from the Canadian government becomes more and more inexplicable.’ ‘ Mr. Clark’s March address to the Canada-Israel Committee prompted a substantial outpouring of press support with the Chronicle-Herald, for example, asserting that the minister had ”served up a cold but correct stew to people who could be relied on to translate his message to Israeli leaders.’ ‘ Just as in 1985 we noted that the negative coverage of Palestinian violence did not affect the Canadian press’s recognition of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, so, too, in 1987-88, we found no evidence to suggest that the harsh criticisms of Israel diminished the Canadian press’s traditional support for the rights of that country. Indeed, several of the negative opinion pieces included at the same time reaffirmations of Canada’s friendship for and commitment to Israel, arguing, as Keith Spicer did in the Ottawa Citizen, that it was important ”to shout our horror” at Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians ”while insisting on our firm attachment to Israel’s existence and legitimacy.’ ‘ Thus, like that of 1985, the coverage of 1987-88 indicates that the Canadian press inclines towards negative treatment of that side seen as principally responsible for the most immediate and publicized acts of violence, but that it does so within an overall balanced view of the rights of both Israel and the Arabs.
(5) Implications for Canadian Foreign Policy Finally, there are grounds for arguing that the character of the Canadian press coverage of the Middle East during our two periods of study had relevance for the making of policy in at least two respects. First, regarding the agenda-setting role of the media, the heavy coverage of hostages, hijackings, assassinations and bombings in the Middle East during the last quarter of 1985 clearly elevated the issue of terrorism on the agenda for public debate and thereby helped to determine the degree of attention that the Government paid to the formulation of policies designed to counteract terrorism domestically and internationally. Thus, following the 1985 incidents, within Canada, the government stepped up security measures at airports, while at the external level it combined with other states within the fora of NATO and the UN to consider ways of dealing with the spec tre of terrorism. Similarly, in 1987-88, the extensive, graphic coverage of the protests in Gaza and the West Bank and of Israel’s reported ”iron fist” response elevated the issue of Israeli policy on the Canadian political agenda, just as occurred during the 1982 war in Lebanon. Both private diplomatic and public responses to Israeli behaviour were called for as a result of the scope and character of the coverage it received. Second, the nature of the media’s coverage of the Middle East arguably had an impact on public opinion and the public mood, in turn, had some effect on policy.
For example, it seems likely that the late 1985 portrayal of radical Palestinians and their allies as perpetrators or sponsors of violent actions influenced the public’s perception of these actors in such a way as to facilitate the Canadian Government’s participation in the economic sanctions organized by the U. S. against Libya in January 1986 as well as its rather oblique support of the subsequent U. S. naval and air attacks on that country.
The responses to a Gallup Poll conducted across Canada in early November 1985 lend support to this argument. Of the respondents 73% stated that they had seen or heard something about the episode involving the Achille Lauro and the American interception of the Egyptian plane carrying the supposed hijackers of the ship, a finding which indicates the extent to which Canadians are exposed to crises in the Middle East by the media. In addition, 80% of those respondents who expressed awareness of the episode (compared to 33% of those unaware) agreed with the view that the U. S. was ”justified in acting against terrorism that endangers American citizens” (Gallup Report, December 16 1985). Doubtless, in deciding to support U.
S. measures against Libya, the Mulroney government was aware of the impact that media coverage of the Achille Lauro incident and of other violent acts by radical Palestinian groups over the preceding months had had upon Canadian public opinion. Similarly, there seems little question that the Canadian press’s generally negative treatment of Israeli actions in the occupied territories from December 1987 on affected public attitudes in Canada toward Israel. As indicated in Table 2, Gallup polls have shown a progressive decline in Canadian sympathy for the Israelis since the late 1970 s, with the number of respondents showing that sentiment reaching a low of 12% in February 1988. Further, a Globe-Environ ics poll, published on March 30, 1988, indicated that 53% of Canadians surveyed disapproved of the way Israel was handling the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, while only 9%approved. The same poll revealed that those whose sympathies were strongly or somewhat pro-Arab had increased since October 1987 from 8 to 14% (Globe and Mail, March 30, 1988, pp.
1-2). While the latter poll results were published subsequent to both of Mr. Clark’s critical public statements regarding Israeli policy, the government was clearly aware throughout the first quarter of 1988 of the anguish Israeli actions, as reported in the media, were causing for Canadians, and this realization presumably lent support to the minister’s determination to rebuke Israel. As David Dewitt has argued in a recent article, ”the sustained television coverage, news reporting, and public analysis of the uprising created tremendous pressures for ‘adjustment’ ” (Dewitt, 1989, p. 22). Sources: Gallup Reports for February 22, 1988; November 27, 1982; November 11, 1978; December 22, 1973 Another poll — this one by Angus Reid Associates — disclosed that Joe Clark correctly gauged the public mood in March 1988, for 56% of those surveyed felt that his criticisms in the address to the Canada-Israel Committee were fair, compared to 22% who felt that they were not (Toronto Star, April 2, 1988, pp.
A 1, 4). Mr. Clark’s address did not, however, signal any change in Canada’s position on the resolution of the Palestinian question. According to David Bercuson, ”the important point of the speech was not that Mr. Clark castigated Israel, but that in the remainder of it he outlined well-established ”principles of Canadian-Middle East policy,’ ‘including ”support for the right of Israel to exist within secure and recognized boundaries” and respect for ”the human rights of Palestinians,’ ‘ including the right to a”homeland within a clearly defined territory” (Bercuson, 1989, p.
19). Thus, not only was the decision to rebuke Israel in keeping with the public mood in the spring of 1988, as manifested in the media and opinion polls, but so, too, was the overall content of the speech, which reflected, as does our analysis of the media, the preference of Canadians for a balanced policy on the Palestinian question whatever side in the conflict might be responsible for the latest instances of violence. Since the period of our press analysis, there have been significant new moves in Canadian policy toward Israel and the Palestinians. Most notably, on March 30, 1989, Joe Clark announced the removal of restrictions on official contacts with representatives of the PLO and asserted that Canada supported ”the principle that the Palestinians have the right to self-determination” to be ”exercised through peace negotiations in which the Palestinians play a full part” (Clark, 1989, p. 2). Further, in mid-1989, Canada began to support UN resolutions that were openly critical of Israel’s response to the intifada h, whereas previously it had largely opposed or abstained on such resolutions.
These shifts in policy were probably principally a response to the moderate position adopted by PLO chairman Yasser Arafat toward Israel in November 1989; the subsequent United States decision in December to initiate diplomatic contacts with the PLO, leaving Canada in an isolated position; and Canada’s assumption of a seat on the UN Security Council in 1989, where its voting behaviour was subject to closer scrutiny by a UN majority sympathetic towards the Palestinians. Nevertheless, one cannot discount how the media’s continuing coverage of the Middle East and especially of throughout this period helped to create a climate of opinion that made these policy moves palatable to Canadians. 1 The traditional view, based essentially upon non-systematic analysis, was that the Canadian media over the years showed strong sympathy for Israel while often reflecting a blatant anti-Arab or Palestinian bias. See Dewitt & Kirton, 1983, pp.
368, 383, 386, 390; Ismael, 1976, pp. 260, 264-265; Lyon, 1982, p. 4; Cohn, 1979, p. 34; Choquet, 1984, pp. 75-85; Noble, 1983, pp. 3-7; Sa joo, 1988, pp.
9-11. Content analyses conducted in the 1980 s, however, have shown the media to be relatively even-handed in its treatment of Middle East actors except when they are responsible for aggressive, violent acts. See Keenleyside, Soderlund, & Burton, 1985; Kirton, Bare i, &Smock um, 1985. Perhaps the most widely cited general treatise on this subject is Cohen, 1963. For a thoughtful Canadian perspective, see in particular, Stairs, 1976, 1977-78. A random check of the content of stories was undertaken and it established that there was a high level of congruence between the nature of stories as portrayed by headlines and their actual substance.
Prior to the 1988 poll, the question was worded, ”Do you find yourself more in sympathy with the Arabs or with the Israelis?’ ‘ In 1988, the word ”Palestinians” was substituted for ”Arabs.’ ‘ For a more detailed discussion of the causes of these policy shifts, see Goldberg, 1989, pp. 25-26. Goldberg and Taras (1989, p. 221) arrive at a similar conclusion. ReferencesBercuson, D. (1989).
Canadian policy in historical perspective. Middle East Focus, 11 (3), 18-20, 30. Canadian News Index. Toronto: Macromedia. Choquet, M. (1984).
Canadian mass media and the Middle East. In Tare q Ismael (Ed. ), Canadian Arab relations, policy and perspectives (pp. 75-85). Ottawa: Jerusalem International Publishing House. Clark, J.
(1989). Statement by the Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs.